Volume 73
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 73,
1968-1969
10-1-1968

Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Recent Cases, 73 DICK. L. REV. 177 (1968).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol73/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Recent Cases

PURCHASER'S ASSUMPTION OF SELLER'S BUSINESS
LIABILITIES HELD PAYMENT IN THE YEAR
OF SALE UNDER SECTION 453 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

Irwin v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1968).
In Irwin v. Commissioner1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled that in a sale of partnership assets the purchaser's
assumption and payment of the partnership's current liabilities in
the year of sale did not constitute a "payment in the year of sale"
for purposes of deferring payment of taxes until the year payment
for a sale is received. Section 4532 of the Internal Revenue Code
1. 390 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'g 45 T.C. 544 (1966).
2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 453.
INSTALLMENT METHOD
(a) Dealers in Personal Property(1) In General-Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate, a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes
of personal property on the installment plan may return as income
therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of the installment
payments actually received in that year which the gross profit,
realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to
the total contract price.
(2) Total Contract Price.-.
(b) Sales of Realty and Casual Sale of Personalty.(1) General Rule-Income from(A) a sale or other disposition of real property, or
(B) a casual sale or other casual disposition of personal
property (other than property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer
if on hand at the end of the taxable year) for a price
exceeding $1,000, may (under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary or his delegate) be returned on the
basis and in the manner prescribed in subsection (a).
(2) Limitation-Paragraph (1) shall apply(A) In the case of a sale or other disposition during a tax-

permits the seller of a business who makes a deferred payment sale
for a price in excess of $1,000 to report the gain from the sale in the
year payment is actually received; provided that, in the taxable
year of sale there are: (1) no payments to the seller, or (2) that the
payments to the seller, exclusive of evidences of the purchaser's
indebtedness, does not exceed 30% of the selling price. 3 If the
payments in the year of sale exceed 30% of the selling price or if
for another reason the taxpayer is deprived from electing to use
section 453, he may be confronted with the burden of paying the
full tax on his realized gain in the taxable year of sale. This may
result in a tax which is greater than the amount of cash actually
4
received in the year of sale.
The decision by the fifth circuit in Irwin reverses an earlier
Tax Court decision,' and resolves a conflict between the views of
the Tax Court and those of the ninth circuit as expressed in United
States v. Marshall." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the ninth circuit and held in Irwin that, although the
liabilities were assumed and paid in the year of sale, Congress
intended that the benefits of section 453 should not be denied the
taxpayer if the payments to him, exclusive of the liabilities, did not
exceed 30% of the selling price. As the benefit of applying section
453 results in a tax deferral rather than a tax avoidance it is submitted that the broad interpretation of Irwin is justified as being
within the spirit of Congress' purpose in enacting section 453.
able year beginning after December 31, 1953 . . . only
if in the taxable year of the sale or other disposition(i) there are no payments, or
(ii) the payments (exclusive of evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser do not exceed 30 per cent
of the selling price ...
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 453b(1) B, b(2) (A) (i),(ii).
4. E.g., Peter Mamula, 41 T.C. 572 (1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 1016 (9th
Cir. 1965) (the taxpayer was burdened with a tax in excess of $30,000 but
received only $10,000 in the year of sale); Joseph Hormberger, CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1960-43 (1960) (upholding a tax deficiency of over $200,000
where the taxpayer received only $7500 in cash in the year of sale).
However, even if section 453 is not available perhaps the taxpayer may still
avoid the burden of an unduly large tax payment through the use of (1)
The Deferred Payment Method provided by Treas. Reg. 1.453-6 (a) (1), or
(2) The "Return of Capital" Method as found in Burnet v. Logan, 283
U.S. 404 (1931).
See, Comment, Taxation of Deferred Payment Sales of
Realty and Casual Sales of Personalty, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 195 (1965).
5. Ivan Irwin, Jr., 45 T.C. 544 (1966).
6. 357 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'g, 241 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
The Court of Appeals decision in Marshall was reported just nine days
prior to the Tax Court's determination of Irwin. See Koblenz, Installment
Sales-PurchasersAssumption of Liability to Third Party, 18 WEST. RESERVE
LAW REV. 906 (1967); Berger, Installment Sales With Assumed Liabilities, 122 J. ACCOUNTANCY, 41 (1966); De Castro and Chodorow, Can Buyers
Payment of Assumed Debt Kill Sellers Installment Election? Courts Disagree, 25 J. TAXATION 130 (1966); Comment, Assumption and Discharge
of Sellers Liabilities as Year of Sale Payments For Purposes of I.R.C. Section 453, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 758 (1967); Note, Installment Sales Report of
Income are Current Liabilities Similar to Mortgages, 1 CALIF. WEST. L.
REV. 154 (1965).
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THE IRWIN SITUATION

7

The taxpayers in Irwin owned a fire and casualty insurance
agency which acted as an intermediary between selling agents and
insurance companies. The agents, upon making a sale, would remit
the premium to the agency, retaining their commission. When an
agent reported a sale, the agency, which operated on an accrual
accounting basis, would debit accounts receivable from agents and
credit accounts payable to insurance companies (and commissions
earned).' The payment to the insurance company was ordinarily
due within ninety days from the date a policy was sold.9
The agency was sold for $471,539.64, of which the purchaser
paid $81,539.64 in cash and delivered notes for the balance of
$390,000.10 The purchaser acquired all the assets of the business
and agreed to assume all of the agency's liabilities. 1 The accounts
receivable from agents constituted the bulk of the assets, and the
accounts payable to insurance companies was the greatest liability.12 The amount of cash received from the sale was less than 30
per cent of the selling price, and when apportioned among the
partners remained less than 30%. The partners, regarding this as
the only "payment in the year of sale," elected to report their in7. The agency was owned on a partnership basis. Barney and
Margaret Vanston owned 70%, Edmund F. Vanston owned 15% and Ann
Vanston Irwin owned 15%. Ann Vanston Irwin is the wife of Ivan Irwin
under whose name the case was decided. Ivan Irwin, Jr., 45 T.C. 544, 545
(1965).
8. Assuming the agent's commission to be 20% and the agency's
commission to be 10%, the sale of a policy with a $100.00 annual premium
would result in the following accounting entries:
Accounts Receivable Agents
$80
Accounts Payable to
Insurance Companies
$70
Commission Income
$10
45 T.C. at 546.
9. Id. at 546.
10. Id. at 547. The selling price was based on the book value of net
assets of $78,002.91 plus unrecorded goodwill in the amount of $393,536.73.
11. Id. at 547.
12. On the date of sale the balance sheet would have read in a manner similar to the following:
Total Assets
$349,189.86
Accounts Receivable
from Agents
$236,535.17
Total Liabilities
271,186.95
Premium Notes Payable
69,623.46
Accounts payable to:
Insurance companies
$194,299.67
Accrued Payroll taxes
1,480.70
Notes Payable (automobile)
3,596.51
Accounts Payable (other)
2,186.61
45 T.C. at 547.

come under the installment method of section 453.13 The Commissioner, however, determined that the liabilities of the partnership
which were assumed by the purchaser amounted to $271,186.95 of
which $237,904.05 were paid in the year of sale.14 The Commissioner
sought to have the entire long term capital gain reported as income
in 1959.15 This was rejected by the Tax Court, but the court did
rule that the amount of liabilities assumed and paid ($237,974.05)
constituted a payment in the year of sale. 16 Each partner's ratable
share of this amount, said the court, would have to be attributed
to the amount received in 1959, the taxable year of sale; this resulted in each taxpayer receiving an amount in excess of 30% of
the portion of the entire selling price due him, so that none of the
taxpayers was eligible to elect under 453. The court therefore
assessed a total deficiency of $82,029.55.1
The Tax Court regarded the final payment of the seller's debt
in the year of sale as tantamount to the seller's receipt of cash or
other tangible property. The court also regarded as controlling
those cases which held that a cancellation or payment of the seller's
indebtedness as part of the consideration is a payment to the seller
if the seller's liability is "extinguished" in the year of sale.'8 These
cases involve: (1) the vendee's cancellation of the vendor's prior
indebtedness to him; 19 (2) the payment of the vendor's legal ex13. The following represents the manner in which the partners received and divided the proceeds of the sale and reported to the Internal
Revenue in their joint returns for 1959.
Edmund
Partners
Ann V.
Barney and
Vanston
Margaret
Irwin
Vanston
$336,884.33
$63,744.70
1. Sales Price
$70,910.61
2. Basis in Partner61,618.96
4,609.02
ship Interest
11,744.93
3. Net Long-Term
275,265.37
59,135.68
Capital Gain
59,135.68
92.77
4. Percent of Gain
81.3947
81.71
5. Cash received
12,410.61
63,844.33
5,244.70
in 1959
6. 30% of Sale price
21,273.18
101,065.30
19,123.41
7. Gain recognized
in 1959 (Col. 4
x Col. 5)
10,399.79
52,199.88
4,865.51
45 T.C. at 548.
14. Id. at 548, 552.
15. Id. at 548.
16. Id. at 552.
17. 45 T.C. 545. This demonstrates the hardship that the unavailability of section 453 can work. In the case of Edmund Vanston and his
wife, who received a cash payment of $5,244.70 in 1959, his 1959 tax
deficiency alone amounted to $13,921.12 or more than 21A times the amount
actually received in the year the tax was imposed. The deficiency of
Ivan and Ann Irwin amounted to $11,401.45, compared to cash received of
$12,410.61. The deficiency of Barney and Margaret Vanston was $56,707.98
compared to $63,884.33 cash received. It is likely in the latter two cases
that when coupled with the tax originally reported in 1959 the deficiency
caused the total tax bill to exceed the total cash received.
18. 45 T.C. at 551.
19. W. H. Batcheller, 19 B.T.A. 1050 (1930).
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penses of the sale by the vendee; 20 and (3) the cancellation of
the vendor's notes to a third party.21 Other indications of this
principle can be found in rulings of the Internal Revenue
Service which (1) regard the value of the mortgage as a payment
in the year of sale when the mortgaged property is sold to the
mortgagee, 22 and (2) hold that in sales of realty where the purchaser assumes and pays liabilities of the seller which represent
"liens, accrued interest and taxes," these liabilities are deemed
payments in the year of sale. 23 The court conceded that if the
obligations were merely assumed and not paid they would not
constitute payments in the year of sale.24 In summation the Tax
Court stated:
We recognize as an established general rule that if, as part
of the consideration for a sale, a seller's liability is paid or
cancelled in the year of sale, the amount of the liability so
extinguished is properly included in the year-of-sale payments, but if the liability is merely assumed (or the asset
transferred 'subject to' the liability) the liability is not
necessarily deemed to be a year of sale payment ....
[W] e consider this dichotomous general rule to be in accord
with the policy and rationale which underlie the installprivilege and its presently existing 30-perment reporting
25
cent test.
The Tax Court felt justified in reaching this result, for it also
was of the opinion that, although the cash which is paid to a third
party in discharging a seller's obligation is not available to the
seller to enable him to pay his taxes, the payment releases the
seller's non-business assets held in reserve to pay these debts. 26
The major fallacy of this reasoning is the assumption that, where
business obligations are assumed and paid by the purchaser of the
business, the seller has held non-business assets in reserve to discharge these obligations (which reserves are now released to pay
27
the tax).
20. Wagegro Corp., 38 B.T.A. 1225 (1938).
21. James Hammond T.C. 198 (1942).
22. I.T. 2351, VI-1 CuM. BULL. 43 (1926) (distinguishing the situations
where the mortgage was assumed by a third party purchaser).
23. REv. RUL. 60-52, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 186.
24. 45 T.C. at 551. See, Estate of Lipman v. United States, 245 F. Supp.
393 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Schneeder v. Lucas, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 572 (W.D.
Ky. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 47 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 622 (1931); Katherin H. Watson, 20 B.T.A. 270 (1930).
Cf. Stephen A. Cisler, Jr., 39 T.C. 458 at 465 (1962).
25. 45 T.C. at 552.
26. Id. at 550.
27. See, Comment, Assumption and Discharge of Seller's Liabilities as
Year of Sale Payments for Purpose of I.R.C. Section 453, 16 BUFF. L.
REv. 756, 766 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Comment).

Almost as an after thought, the Tax Court also rejected the
final argument of the taxpayer. This argument was based on a
regulation which excluded the assumption of a mortgage on realty
by the purchaser from being considered as year-of-sale payments
unless the liabilities assumed exceeded the seller's basis for the
property sold.28 The taxpayer sought to extend this regulation to
his casual sale of personalty, but the analogy was not accepted. 29
The Tax Court's reasoning was rejected by the fifth circuit, which
chose instead to follow the decision reached by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Marshall.10
In Marshall an agricultural business, which was a sole proprietorship, was sold for a price of $110,513.22 of which $14,000 in
cash was paid by the purchaser in the year of sale.31 The purchaser,
however, in the year of sale paid over $25,000 of business obligations
(which he had assumed along with the business assets) for which
the seller would ultimately have been personally liable. This payment, contended the Commissioner, had to be included as a payment to the seller, so that the seller's total payments in the year of
sale exceeded 30% of the selling price. This contention, if upheld,
would have resulted in the taxpayer-seller owing a tax in excess of
$20,000.12

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district

court's rejection of the Commissioner's contention. The court
appeared particularly concerned that the seller apparently had no
way to control the purchaser's payment. It followed that the seller
could not control the imposition of the tax.3 The Marshall court
regarded the Commissioner's contention as untenable when the
congressional purpose of enacting section 453 was considered; it
accordingly extended to this sale of a business its earlier mortgage
exclusion rulings. 4 It was this giving of effect to congressional
intent to provide a tax relief measure that was relied on by the
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c).
See note 40 infra and accompanying
text.
29. We can not agree that this regulation applies as petitioner argues it should in the instant case, even in principle.
In the case before us not only was there no mortgage, but the
liabilities assumed were short term, and in fact the vendee paid
off most of them in the year of sale. We are convinced that the
regulation should be read to apply only to liabilities which are assumed but not paid in the year of sale.
45 T.C. at 553. See discussion accompanying notes 40-46 infra.
30. 357 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1966). The Tax Court in Irwin realized
that the decision of the district court in this case was on appeal at the time
of its determination and specifically rejected the reasoning of the district
court, 241 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Calif. 1964) which was specifically upheld.
See 45 T.C. at 554, 555.
31. 357 F.2d at 296.
32. Id. at 295.
33. Id. at 296. In addition the Court expressed concern over the
tax attributable to the sale exceeding the amount realized in cash in the
year of sale and also the difficulty of the seller's ascertainment of what
obligations had been paid.
34. Id. at 295.
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fifth circuit in its reversal of the Tax Court in Irwin.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION

453

The rationale of Installment Sales Reporting provided for by
section 453 did not originate in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code but
was actually promulgated by the Commissioner about 1920. The
Commissioner sought to issue regulations which would allow taxpayers to avoid the potential tax hardship connected with installment sales.85 The hardship was the same as presented in the
Marshall and Irwin cases; the taxpayer who realized a gain from
an installment sale often lacked sufficient liquidity to pay the tax
on the realized gain if the full amount of the tax were imposed in
the year of sale. The Commissioner, by regulation, sought to
30
It
allow the tax to be paid in the year payment was received.
was ruled, however, that the Commissioner lacked authority to
issue such a regulation. 37 The logic and fairness of the Commissioner's position was not to be denied, however, and in 1926 Congress adopted the Installment Method of Reporting Income into
statutory form and gave the Commissioner authority to implement
the intent of the act through additional regulations.8 8
In response to this legislation the courts recognized the congressional intent to alleviate a potential burden and hardship on

the taxpayers when in fact the selling taxpayer received only a
small portion of the selling price in the year of sale.3 9 The Commissioner also responded in a way calculated to benefit the taxpayer.
Regulation 1.453-440 concerning the sale of mortgaged property pro35. TREAS. REG. 45, Art. 42 (1919); TREAS. REG. 33, Art. 117 (1918).
36. Id. See, COMMENT, supra note 27, at 759.
37. E.g., Six Hundred and Fifty West End Ave. Co., 2 B.T.A. 958
(1925); Hoover Bond Co., 1 B.T.A. 929 (1925); B.B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A.
762 (1925).
38. REVENUE ACT of 1926, c. 27 § 212 (d), 44 STAT. 23 (1926).
39. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948).
See Burnet v. S. and L. Building Corp., 288 U.S. 406 (1933); S. REP. No.
52, 69th CONG., 1st SESS. 19 (1925); Hearings Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means of Revenue Revision, 69th CONG. 80 (1925); 2 J.
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 15.01 (Rev. ed. 1961).
40. TREAs. REG. § 1.453-4. Sale of real property involving deferred
periodic payments(a) In general. Sales of real property involving deferred payments include (1) agreements of purchase and sale which contemplate that a conveyance is not to be made at the outset, but
only after all or a substantial portion of the selling price has
been paid, and (2) sales in which there is an immediate transfer of title, the vendor being protected by a mortgage or other
lien as to deferred payments.
(b) Classes of sales. Such sales, under either paragraph (a) (1)
or (2) of this section, fall into terms of sale, as follows:

vides in section (c) that if the property is sold subject to a mortgage,
the amount of the mortgage assumed and paid by the purchaser is
not to be calculated as a payment in the year of sale for purposes of
of the 30% test of section 453.41
42

This regulation has been extended

to apply to personal property.
The merits of extending the mortgage exclusion regulation to
personalty by analogy have been discussed by two articles in which
the authors proposed opposing views. 4 3 The view which criticizes
the extension of regulation 1.453-4(c) to personalty sales asserts that
if such extension is valid at all, it is valid only in cases where the
debts of the vendor are similar to mortgages.
Neither McWilliams nor Cisler would appear to support
. ..[the statement that] . . . 'Debts of the vendor assumed
by the purchaser are treated the same way as mortgages.'
These cases stand only for the proposition that debts of the
(1) Sales of real property which may be accounted for on
the installment method, that is sales of real property in
which (i) there are no payments during the taxable year
of the sale or (ii) the payments in such taxable year (exclusive of evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser) do
not exceed 30 per cent of the selling price.
(c) Determination of "selling price." In the sale of mortgaged
property the amount of the mortgage, whether the property is
merely taken subject to the mortgage or whether the mortgage
is assumed by the purchaser; shall, for the purposes of determining whether a sale is on the installment plan, be included
as a part of the "selling price"; and for the purpose of determining the payments and the total contract price as those
terms are used in section 453, and §§ 1.453.1 through 1.453.7,
the amount of such mortgage shall be included only to the
extent that it exceeds the basis of the property. The term
"payments does not include amounts received by the vendor
in the year of sale from the disposition to a third person of
notes given by the vendee as part of the purchase price which
are due and payable in subsequent years. Commissions and
other selling expenses paid or incurred by the vendor shall not
reduce the amount of the payments, the total contract price, or
the selling price.
The validity of this regulation would seem to be assured from the upholding of its virtually identical predecessor by the Supreme Court in Burnet
v. S. and L. Building Corp., 288 U.S. 406 (1933). See generally, Stonecrest
Corp. 24 T.C. 659, 665 (1955).
41. The regulation provides an exception when the mortgage assumed
exceeds the basis of the property sold. Stephen A. Cisler, Jr., 39 T.C. 458
(1962).
42. E.g., I.T. 2468 VIII-1 CUM. BULL. 159 (1929) (a ruling by the
Commissioner in regards to the purchasers assumption of a debt still owed
for the stock he purchased, it was ruled that such assumption is to be
considered the same as the assumption of a mortgage); Stephen A Cisler,
Jr. 39 T.C. 458, 466 (1962) (dictum which approves the application of the
regulation to casual sales of personalty); Katherine H. Wilson, 20 B.T.A.

270 (1930) (sum of assumed liabilities such as taxes and mortgage interest
governed by the regulation); J. W. McWilliams, 15 B.T.A. 329 (1929) (the
term mortgages regarded as including the sellers long-term indebtedness
on installment contracts for the sale of realty).
43. Compare Note, Installment Sale Reporting of Income-Are Current Liabilities Similar to Mortgages?, 1 CALIF. WEST. LAW REV. 154, 156
(1965) with Comment, Assumption and Discharge of Seller's Liabilities
as Year of Sale Payments for Purposes of I.R.C. Section 453, 16 BUFF. LAW.
Ray. 758, 763 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Note and Comment respectively).
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vendor similar to mortgages are to be treated the same way
as mortgages. . . . To extend the construction of the regulation beyond this rather narrow proposition would appear'
to stretch the
role of judicial construction into the area of
44
legislation.
It would seem however that this author as well as the ,Tax
Court
fails to recognize the Commissioner's 1929 ruling which
apparently involved the assumption of an unsecured debt
[see note 42].
If, however, a similarity to mortgages is necessary in.
order for an assumed debt to be treated like a mortgage, a
similarity in effectuating the
45 Congressional intent of section 453 should be sufficient.
This latter article, which advocates giving effect to CongreSS'
intent, points out that regardless of whether a mortgage or an ulsecured liability is assumed, excluding payments under both as year
of sale payments relieves the seller from a "disproportionate tax
liability, a liability which in some instances is greater than the
46
down payment.
THE SPIRIT OF

453

PREVAILS

The circuit court decisions in both the Marshall and the Irwin
cases relied primarily on the intent of Congress which fostered the
enactment of section 453. Citing Commissioner v. South Texas
Lumber Co.41 as authority, the Irwin court said that the purpose
in enacting section 453 was
to relieve taxpayers from having to pay an income tax in
the year of sale based on the full amount of anticipated
profits when in fact they had received in cash only a small.
portion of the sales price .... .8
In their determination to give effect to this underlying philosophy, the fifth circuit in Irwin refused to be bound by the cases
which the Tax Court had found to be controlling.49 The court
examined each case and found that none was directly in line with
the fact situation presented in Irwin. The court, however, felt it
necessary to distinguish these cases on the basis that they cancelled a debt of the seller, whereas in Irwin the seller's debt was
44. Note, supra note 43, at 156.
45. Comment, supra note 43, at 763.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 763.
333 U.S. 496 (1948). See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
Irwin v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1968).
See cases and rulings cited notes 18 through 24 supra and, ac-

companying text.

assumed.50 Indeed, this may be the case, but the distinction seems
somewhat tenuous. Regardless of whether the debt of the seller
is cancelled or assumed, the effect is the same; the seller's liability is relieved, and, in a sense, he realizes the amount of his
debt. 51 As suggested in an article which appeared while the appeal
in Irwin was pending, it appears that the court would have been
on firmer ground had they simply overruled the earlier cases.
These cases appear to have been erroneously decided at least to the
52
extent that they distinguished a cancellation from an assumption.
The Irwin court criticized the distinction made by the Tax
Court between cases where the seller's debt was assumed and
those where it was assumed and paid. 3 Using the mortgage analogy derived from regulation 1.453-4 (c) and the decision in Marshall, the court determined that assumed liabilities which were in
54
fact paid must not be considered payments in the year of sale.
The Irwin court was convinced that there was no justice in distinguishing mortgages on real property from obligations connected
with personal property. In either situation the taxpayer may be
forced to liquidate his assets if he is to meet the burden of the tax
imposed without the benefit of 453. If the spirit of section 453 will
support the mortgage exclusion regulation of the Commissioner, it
is difficult to see why it will not also support the Court's holding
in Irwin. The court therefore concluded:
We agree with the Marshall Court that these current liabilities, although assumed and paid, are not, under the statute, payments within the year of sale. They are excluded
by reason of the mortgage assumption exception of the
Regulation. 5
CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to present a summation as to the
difficulties and issues presented by the assumption and payment
of seller's obligations by the purchaser. Perhaps it would be preferable for prospective vendors and vendees to avoid the assumption and payment of these obligations; unfortunately this is not

always possible. This is especially true where the sale involves
a going concern and the obligations are connected to the operation
of the business. It is often necessary, as well as practical, for the
vendee to assume and pay the business obligations, many of which
will be short term obligations which require payment in the year of
50. Irwin v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1968).
51. Although where the debt is assumed the seller may remain second-

arily liable unless there is a novation. This should not be a ground for
distinguishing the cancellation cases from the assumption cases. Furthermore, in Irwin the debt assumed was, in fact, paid.
52. Comment, supra note 43 at 764-5.
53. See cases cited note 24 supra and accompanying text.
54. Irwin v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1968).
55. Id. at 96. See, 2 J. M RTNs, supra note 39, § 15.16 (rev. ed. 1967).
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sale. Irwin and Marshallare recognitions of this practical dilemma,
and until some new argument is advanced by the Commissioner,
they are a resolution of the problem. The result seems just as:
(1) it is the implementation of a mere tax deferral not a tax avoidance; (2) the necessity for relief is apparent; and (3) the business
liabilities are as much a part of the business as a mortgage is a part
of the realty. It is hoped, therefore, that rather than attempting
to frustrate the opinion of the two circuit courts, the Commissioner
will enact detailed regulations for factual settings which may differ
from that of Irwin, and have those regulations reflect the spirit of
section 453.
WILLIAM S. KEISER

NEGLIGENCE-SCHOOL BUS DRIVER
HELD TO ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Central School DistrictNo. 1,
21 N.Y.2d 239, 234 N.E.2d 243 (1967)
In Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Central School District No. 1,1
the Court of Appeals of New York held that a fourteen year old
boy's contributory negligence did not prevent recovery in an action
against a school district whose bus driver failed, as required by
statutes: (1) to instruct the boy to cross the highway in front of
the stopped bus; and (2) to keep the school bus halted with red
signal lights flashing until the boy reached the opposite side of the
highway. While recognizing that most statutory violations do not
result in absolute liability, the court felt that such liability should
apply to this particular violation of New York's Vehicle and Traffic
Law. 2 The court held that violation of the statute resulted in
absolute liability, and the pupil's contributory negligence was not a
defense to the action against the school district.
Michael Van Gaasbeck and a friend were discharged from a
school bus. The bus driver drove away before the boys crossed to
the other side of the highway where they lived.3 When the boys
attempted to cross the highway, Michael was struck by an automobile. Michael, then fourteen years old, died a few days later.
Wrongful death actions were commenced against the school district
and the driver of the car that struck Michael. The trial court
charged that Michael's contributory negligence would bar recovery
against any of the defendants. The trial court felt that the bus
driver's violation of the school bus statute was negligence per se
and that contributory negligence would be a proper defense in such
a case. A verdict for both defendants resulted and the appellate
division affirmed.4 The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed as to the defendant school district but affirmed as to the
driver of the automobile and ordered a new trial for a jury determination of proximate cause.
There is disagreement as to the common law duty owed by a
1. 21 N.Y.2d 239, 234 N.E.2d 243 (1967).
2. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1174 (McKinney 1960) provides:
(b) The driver of school bus, when discharging pupils who
must cross the highway, shall instruct such pupils to cross
in front of the bus and the driver thereof shall keep such
school bus halted with red signals flashing until such pupils have reached the opposite side of the highway.
3. The bus driver readily admitted that she had not performed her
required duties. See Record at p. 189, Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Central
School District No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d 239, 234 N.E.2d 243 (1967).
4. Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Central School District No. 1, 25 A.D.
2d 820, 270 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1966).
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school bus driver to the students riding in a school bus.5 Some
courts have held that a school bus driver owes the highest degree
of care to the students he is transporting.6 Others have held that
he is required to exercise only ordinary care and prudence.' Which
alternative is adopted often depends on whether the school bus is
acting as a common or private carrier of the children.'
Statutes in many states increase the bus driver's common law
duty by requiring him to stop to the right of the road and use a
flashing stop signal whenever a child must cross the highway on
which the bus is stopped.9 Many statutes also impose a duty on
approaching motorists to stop while a bus driver is discharging or
picking up passengers. 10 In actions against either an approaching
5.

See generally, 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND

PRACTICE § 2177 (1946).
6. See, e.g., Van Cleave v. Illini Coach Co., 344 Ill. App. 127, 100
N.E.2d 398 (1951); Lincoln City Lines v. Schmidt, 245 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.
1957); Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Talbot, 234 F.2d
425 (5th Cir. 1956); Landry v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 155 So. 2d
102 (La. App. 1963); Hawkins County v. Davis, 216 Tenn. 262, 391 S.W.2d
658 (1965); Sheffield v. Lovering, 51 Ga. App. 353, 180 S.E. 523 (1935)
(statutory duty).
7. See, e.g., Weems v. Robbins, 243 Ala. 276, 9 So. 2d 882 (1942);
Shannon v. Central-Gaither Union School Dist., 133 Cal. App. 124, 23 P.2d
769 (1933); Campbell v. Patton, 227 Md. 125, 175 A.2d 761 (1961); Gaudette
v. McLaughlin, 88 N.H. 368, 189 A. 872 (1937); Archuleta v. Jacobs, 43 N.M.
425, 94 P.2d 706 (1939).
8. See discussion in Hawkins County v. Davis, 216 Tenn. 262, 391
S.W.2d 658 (1965).
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-658(c)
(Supp. 1967); CAL. VEHICLE CODE
§ 22112 (West 1960); COLO. REv. STAT, ANN. § 13-5-83(2) (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277 (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 4166 (b)
(Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 196(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.372(1) (Supp. 1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.375
(1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:80(B) (1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90,
§ 7B (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.43 (Supp. 1967); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 392.410 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:38-a (1966); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 39:4-128.1 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-46(2) (Supp.
1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1018(d.1) (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
23 § 1281(10); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.370(2) (Supp. 1967); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 31-150(b) (1967).
10. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-658(d) (1957); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-5-83(1) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-279 (Supp. 1967);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 4166(a)

(Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 234.04

(1) (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1667(a) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 951/2, § 196(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 47-2131,
47-2132

(1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.372

(Supp. 1968); LA.

REV. STAT.

§ 32:80(A) (1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 14 (Supp. 1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169.43 (Supp. 1967); MO. STAT. ANN. § 304.050 (1967); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 79-488.02

N.M. STAT. ANN.
N.D.

CENT.

§ 1018(a)

(1966);

§ 64-18-46

CODE §

N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:4-128.1

(1953); N.C. GEN. STAT.

39-10-46(1)

(Supp.

1967);

(Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.

PA.

(Supp. 1967);

§ 20-217

STAT.

§ 31-20-12

ANN.

(1965);
tit. 75

(Supp. 1966);

motorist or the school bus driver it has been held that proof of
contributory negligence will generally bar recovery."
In Van Gaasbeck the court had to decide what effect should be
given to the bus driver's violation of a state statute requiring the
driver to: (1) instruct all pupils to cross in front of the school bus;
and (2) employ the stop signals of the bus while a student is crossing the street. If the violation of the statute were treated as
negligence per se or merely evidence of negligence, contributory
negligence would be a defense. If, on the other hand, the court
ruled the statutory breach resulted in absolute liability, contributory negligence would not be a defense. Since the action against
the approaching motorist was based solely on the common law
duty of ordinary care, contributory negligence barred a recovery
against him.
Where a statute prescribes a standard of conduct for the purpose of protecting persons from a certain type of risk, the statutory
prescription of conduct is considered in determining civil liabilities
when the harm to the person sought to be protected results from
the breach of the statutory standard. 12 The courts are divided,
however, on the effect to be given to the violation of the statute. A
majority of American courts treat the unexcused violation of the
statutory standard as negligence per se,'8 while a substantial minor-

TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-851 (a) (Supp. 1967); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 6701d
§ 104(a) (1960); VA. CODE A.NN. § 46.1-190 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.61.370(1) (Supp. 1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-12-7 (Supp. 1968);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-150(a) (1950).
11. See, e.g., Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn. 590, 159 A. 575 (1932); Pond v.
Somes, 302 Mass. 587, 20 N.E.2d 449 (1939); Hughes v. Thayer, 229 N.C.
773, 51 S.E.2d 488 (1949); Fedorovich v. Glenn, 337 Pa. 60, 9 A.2d 358
(1939); Ashley v. Ensley, 44 Wash. 2d 74, 265 P.2d 829 (1954); Machenheimer v. Falknor, 144 Wash. 27, 255 P. 1031 (1927); Foster v. Einer, 69
Cal. App. 341, 158 P.2d 978 (1945); Shannon v. Central-Gaither Union
School Dist., 133 Cal. App. 124, 23 P.2d 769 (1933); Wheaton v. Conkle, 57
Ohio App. 373, 14 N.E.2d 363 (1937). But see International Harvester Co.
v. Williams, 222 Ala. 595, 133 So. 275 (1931); Sepulvado v. General Fire &
Casualty Co., 146 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 1962). See generally, Prosser,
Contributory Negligence As Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN. L.
REV. 105 (1948).

12. See generally, HARPER AND JAMES, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 17.5,
17.6 (1956); PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 202 (1964); Lowndes, Civil Liability by
Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932); Morris, Criminal Statutes and Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1932).

13. See, e.g., Dobbertin v. Johnson, 95 Ariz. 356, 390 P.2d 849 (1964);
Lambotte v. Payton, 147 Colo. 207, 363 P.2d 167 (1961) (ordinance); Richardson v. Fountain, 154 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1963) (statutes other than traffic);
Teague v. Keith, 214 Ga. 853, 108 S.E.2d 489 (1959); Bale v. Perryman, 85
Idaho 435, 380 P.2d 501 (1963); New York Central R.R. v. Glad, 242
Ind. 450, 179 N.E.2d 571 (1962); Kroblin Refrigerated X-Press, Inc. v. Ledvina, 256 Iowa 229, 127 N.W.2d 133 (1964); Commonwealth v. Ragland
Potter Company, 305 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. App. 1957); Moses v. Mosley, 146
So. 2d 263 (La. 1962); Breezley v. Spiva, 313 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1958);
Hayes v. Hagemeir, 75 N.M. 70, 400 P.2d 945 (1963); Drum v. Bisaner, 252
N.C. 305, 113 S.E.2d 560 (1960); Kaplan v. Philadelphia Trans. Co.,
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ity have held that it is merely evidence of negligence. 14 Where a
violation of a statute constitutes evidence of negligence or negligense per se, contributory negligence and assumption of risk are
proper defenses just as in an action based on a violation of a com15
mon law duty.
There are, however, statutes intended to protect a particular
class of persons against their own inability to protect themselves
and courts have usually found a legislative intent to remove the
defense of contributory negligence from actions based on the violations of these statutes. 16 These statutes have been construed as
placing the entire responsibility upon the defendant, requiring him
to protect those persons who are exercising reasonable care as well
as those who may be exercising no care at all.'7 Typical of this
type of statute are child labor acts,' 8 safety statutes for the benefit
404 Pa. 147, 171 A.2d 166 (1961); Green v. Sparks, 232 S.C. 414, 102 S.E.2d

435 (1958); Zakizewski v. Hyronimus, 81 S.D. 428, 136 N.W.2d 572 (1965);
Alex v. Armstrong, 215 Tenn. 276, 385 S.W.2d 110 (1964); Eubanks v. Wood,
304 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65, 404
P.2d 659 (1965); White v. Gore, 201 Va. 239, 110 S.E.2d 228 (1959); Clevenger v. Fonseca, 55 Wash. 2d 70, 345 P.2d 1098 (1959); Meihost v. Meihost,
29 Wis. 2d 537, 139 N.W.2d 537 (1966).
14. E.g., Martinson v. Scherbel, 268 Minn. 509, 129 N.W.2d 802 (1964)
(prima facie); Alston v. Forsythe, 226 Md. 121, 172 A.2d 474 (1961);
Falvey v. Hamelburg, 347 Mass. 430, 198 N.E.2d 400 (1964); Peterson v.
Skiles, 173 Neb. 470, 113 N.W.2d 628 (1962); Mattero v. Silverman, 71 N.J.
Super. 1, 176 A.2d 270 (1961); Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 67, 134
N.E.2d 526 (1956).
15. E.g., Richardson v. Fountain, 154 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1963); Bale
v. Perryman, 85 Idaho 435, 380 P.2d 501 (1963); Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223
Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 55 (1947); Mattero v. Silvermaji, 71 N.J. Super. 1,
176 A.2d 270 (1961). See generally, Annot. 10 A.L.R.2d 853 (1950); Prosser,
Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 105 (1948).
16. See, e.g., Schmid v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Ill. 1957);
Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959); Bryntesem v.
Carroll Const. Co., 27 Ill. 2d 566, 190 N.E.2d 315 (1963); Koenig v.
Patrick Const. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948); Schelin v.
Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
The Restatement of Torts 2d. § 483 (1965) comment c states:
There are, however, exceptional statutes which are intended
to place the entire responsibility upon the defendant. A statute
may be found to have that purpose particularly where it is enacted in order to protect a certain class of persons against their
In such a case the
own inability to protect themselves ....
purpose of the statute would be defeated if . . . contributory
negligence . . . were permitted to bar his recover.

17. E.g., Osborne v. Salvation Army, 107 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1939);
Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959); Bryntesen v.
Carroll Const. Co., 27 Ill. 2d 566, 190 N.E.2d 315 (1963); Koenig v.
Patrick Const. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
18. E.g., Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887

of -employees,"1 statutes for the protection of intoxicated persons, 20
and statutes forbidding the sale of dangerous articles to minors. 21
Statutes concerning school buses are very common in the
United States, 22 and violations thereof by school bus drivers or
approaching motorists have generally been construed as constituting, at most, negligence per se.2 3 Contributory negligence,
therefore, has been a proper defense to actions brought on behalf
of injured students. 24 Van Gaasbeck, by treating the statutory
violation as imposing absolute liability, in effect eliminated the
defense of contributory negligence in this type of case.
The statute in Van Gaasbeck did not expressly state that a
vidlation thereof was to create absolute liability. 25 The court inferred absolute liability since the statute was designed to protect
a class of persons from a definable hazard which they were incapable of avoiding. 26 The driver, according to the court, had an
unvarying duty to supervise and secure the safety of the school
children. In considering a similar factual situation the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin stated:
No rule could completely eliminate the hazards of crossing
but a rule which requires a driver to see that the road is
clear and that the children cross under his observation
comes as close to securing safety as is reasonably
possible. .

.

. Even when the children know the rules of

care it is within their nature at times to be careless,
.hurried and impulsive and it is these propensities the rule
27
seeks to guard against.
(1920); Dusha v. Virginia & Rainey Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482
(1920); Washburn v. Empire Printing Co., 249 S.W. 709 (Mo. 1923); Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 218 Pa. 311, 67 A. 642 (1907).
19. E.g., Osborne v. Salvation Army, 107 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1939);
Schmid v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Ill. 1957); Bryntesen v. Carroll Const. Co., 27 Ill. 2d 566, 190 N.E.2d 315 (1963); Koenig v. Patrick
Const. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
. .:20. E.g., Mayes v. Byers, 214 Minn. 54, 7 N.W.2d 403 (1943); Soronen
v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958). But see Ramsey v. Anctil,
106 Ni.. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
21. See, e.g., Bass v. Flowers, 177 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1965); Tamiami
Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959); McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa.
584, 119 A. 721 (1923).
22. See statutes cited in notes 9 and 10 supra.
23. See, e.g., Morgan v. Carolina Coach Co., 225 N.C. 668, 36 S.E.2d 263
(1945) (approaching motorist); Reeves v. Tittle, 129 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939); Dishinger v. Suburban Coach Co., 84 Ga. App. 498, 66 S.E.2d
242 (1951). Cf. Clevenger v. Fonseca, 55 Wash. 2d 25, 345 P.2d 1098 (1959).
24. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
25. The court felt, however, that such an intent could be implied
from the language which stated that the driver "shall instruct such pupils"
and he "shall keep such school bus halted. . .

."

Van Gaasbeck v. Weba-

tuck Central School District No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d 239, 244, 234 N.E.2d 243, 246
(1967).
26. Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Central School
District No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d
239, 244, 234 N.E.2d 243, 246 (1967).
27. Verbetem v. Huettl, 253 Wis. 510, 520, 34 N.W.2d 803, 808 (1948).
In the Verbetem decision, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin apparently eliminated contributory negligence as a defense but the court erroneously held
that the violation of the statute was only negligence per se.

Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

While Van Gaasbeck imposes absolute liability for a violation
of a motor vehicle statute, it is doubtful that the New York Court
of Appeals will extend absolute liability beyond school bus cases.
The court specifically stated that absolute liability will not usually
be imposed for a violation of a statute. The New York courts,
furthermore, have consistently held that a violation of a motor
vehicle statute is negligence per se and the court in Van Gaasbeck
expressed no intent to overrule these cases.
Whether the doctrine of absolute liability will be imposed
against approaching motorists who fail to stop at a school bus's
signal was not discussed in Van Gaasbeck. While courts have imposed the doctrine of negligence per se in these cases, no court
appears to have imposed absolute liability on an approaching motorist. Perhaps the distinguishing factor between an approaching
motorist and a school bus driver is the latter's duty and ability to
supervise the children to see that their safety is secure from all
hazards while they are crossing the highway.
JoHN B. MANCKE

